In the fall of 2024 a Cornell sophomore told university police that she had been sexually assaulted over several hours by members of a fraternity. The district attorney, relying on a six-page sworn statement prepared from a much longer police interview, declined to bring the case. Two years later her civil lawsuit put the allegations into the headlines, the Governor handed the criminal investigation to the Attorney General, and a campus case became a national argument over the legal standards that determine what is required to prove rape, and how consent and capacity are determined when drugs and alcohol are involved.
In this TalksOnLaw interview, Joel Cohen speaks with Deborah Tuerkheimer, Professor of Law and Associate Dean at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, a former Manhattan prosecutor, and the author of Credible: Why We Doubt Accusers and Protect Abusers. Using the Cornell case as the frame, Tuerkheimer explains how sexual assault cases are prosecuted, why so many are never charged, and where the law of consent stands and where it may be changing.
The Credibility Discount and the Cornell Case
Tuerkheimer defines "credibility discounting," the patterned tendency to doubt, blame, or disregard people who report abuse, and shows how it operates at every stage of a case. She lays out the three tracks the Cornell allegations have traveled: a criminal complaint that the DA declined to pursue in 2024 on the basis of a six-page sworn statement drawn from a 120-page interview, and that has since been reopened; a Title IX proceeding that expelled two of the seven men and sanctioned others, and a civil suit naming the university, the fraternity, the men, and the accuser's own sorority. She explains what a trauma-informed investigation looks like, why memory of a traumatic event is rarely linear or complete on a first telling, and what evidence a prosecutor may wish to examine in determining whether charges are merited.
How Prosecutors Decide Whether to Charge
A prosecutor deciding whether and how to charge must weigh the evidence, its limitations, and its ambiguities against the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In a sexual assault case that means asking what corroborates or refutes the complainant's account (physical and forensic evidence, messages and photographs on phones, witnesses to the lead-up and the aftermath, and the accounts of the accused), how the complainant's memory may have been affected by trauma and intoxication, and how a jury is likely to receive the facts. Tuerkheimer explains the "stranger rape paradigm" against which such cases have historically been measured, and why cases that depart from it (prior consensual contact, alcohol, a delayed report, continued friendly contact, no overt force) have often been declined. She also explains the role of expert testimony in helping jurors understand why a victim's behavior that seems counterintuitive is common, and the ethical line she draws: a prosecutor must believe the evidence can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but anticipated juror bias should inform how a case is tried rather than whether it is brought.
The conversation then examines the decisions made in the Cornell case: the district attorney's reliance on a six-page sworn statement, the facts he has said led him to conclude there was no evidence of lack of consent, and the parallel Title IX and civil tracks. Tuerkheimer, who says she does not know what went into the decision, adds insights from her experience as a prosecutor, including what a trauma-informed interview looks like, why a complainant's initial willingness, drinking, or friendly messages afterward are facts to be explained rather than reasons to stop, and why she believes a prosecutor who has sufficient evidence should bring the case even at the risk of losing.
Consent and Capacity When Drugs or Alcohol Are Involved
In cases like Cornell's, where drinking and drug use are part of the record, the charging decision depends on how the statute treats capacity. Under New York Penal Law § 130.05, lack of consent may be shown by forcible compulsion, by the victim's incapacity to consent, or, for certain offenses, by circumstances in which the victim "clearly expressed" non-consent. Incapacity includes being "mentally incapacitated," which New York law defines as "temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling" one's conduct because of a substance "administered … without his consent." New York also defines being "physically helpless" as "unconscious or for any other reason … physically unable to communicate unwillingness."
Tuerkheimer explains that New York is one of approximately nineteen states whose laws hold that a person who voluntarily drank or used drugs to the point of being unable to appraise or control her conduct cannot rely on that intoxication alone to establish rape. She explains, however, that even under New York law this does not bar successful prosecutions involving intoxicated persons. Prosecutors can look, for example, for evidence of physical helplessness, forcible compulsion, or expressed non-consent to support charges.
Not all states follow the New York example. According to Tuerkheimer, the affirmative-consent model that some states have adopted reframes the question to ask what each party did to show willingness to engage in the sexual activity. A rule that requires a demonstration of unwillingness, by contrast, can presume, in Tuerkheimer's view, that an inert, passive body is a consenting one. The two also discuss gender and the credibility discount, why a defendant's own intoxication is not a defense, apologies as evidence, video and social-media corroboration, and why many survivors describe the aftermath as bad as or worse than the abuse itself.
What to Know Now
The civil case is ongoing. New York Attorney General Letitia James has been appointed special prosecutor to review the criminal case, and former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates has been retained by Cornell's Board of Trustees to conduct an independent review of the university's handling of the matter.



