Key Takeaways
- Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), bars almost anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison from possessing a firearm, and it is one of the most frequently challenged gun laws in the country.
- Courts defend these bans with two main historical theories: a broad “civic virtue” view that lawbreakers fall outside “the people,” and a narrower “dangerousness” view that allows disarming only those who pose a threat.
- The Supreme Court has not resolved the question, and federal appeals courts are now divided on whether the ban can constitutionally be applied to people with nonviolent convictions.
The Second Amendment says the right to keep and bear arms “shall not be infringed.” So how can federal law permanently bar millions of Americans with felony convictions from owning a gun, including people whose crimes involved no violence at all?
In this TalksOnLaw Brief, Jacob D. Charles, Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law and a leading scholar of firearms law, explains the theories courts use to evaluate felon gun bans, the history behind them, and how New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen changed the litigation.
Who Are “the People”?
Like the First Amendment, Professor Charles notes, the Second is not unlimited. Much of the litigation turns on the phrase “the right of the people” and whether people with felony convictions fall within it. The civic virtue theory holds that, at the founding, lawbreakers were understood to lack the civic virtue required to belong to the armed citizenry. The dangerousness rationale is narrower: the founding generation disarmed people it considered dangerous, not everyone who broke the law, which would leave room for people with nonviolent convictions to keep their rights.
What History Shows, and What It Doesn’t
As Professor Charles explains, no founding-era law disarmed people specifically because of a felony conviction. Such laws date to the 1930s, and the modern federal ban to the 1960s, so advocates reason more abstractly. Some point to historical laws disarming groups deemed dangerous, including odious laws aimed at Native Americans, enslaved Black people, Catholics, and those who refused loyalty oaths. Others argue that because many founding-era felonies carried the death penalty, the lesser penalty of disarmament must have been permissible. Professor Charles points out that then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett, dissenting in Kanter v. Barr on the Seventh Circuit, relied on the dangerousness principle to conclude that a man convicted of a nonviolent Medicare-related mail fraud offense could not be disarmed on that basis alone.
Bruen and the Courts
Section 922(g)(1) is among the most litigated provisions in Second Amendment law because prosecutors charge it so often. Professor Charles describes a paradox: Bruen’s history-focused test may make felon bans easier to defend than the earlier framework, which asked for evidence that a ban actually served public safety, the question posed by the law review article “Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?” He also highlights the Third Circuit’s en banc rehearing in Range v. Attorney General and early lower-court rulings striking down the federal ban on buying guns while under felony indictment.
What to Know Now
In United States v. Rahimi (2024), the Supreme Court upheld the federal ban on gun possession by people under domestic-violence restraining orders, explained that a modern law must fit the principles of the nation’s regulatory tradition rather than match a “historical twin,” and repeated that felon prohibitions are “presumptively lawful.” The en banc Third Circuit ruled for Bryan Range in 2023 and, after reconsidering the case in light of Rahimi, again in December 2024; the Justice Department did not seek further review. Other courts, including the en banc Ninth Circuit in United States v. Duarte (2025), have upheld the ban even for nonviolent offenses, and the Supreme Court has so far declined to take up the split. In United States v. Hemani (2026), the Court held a prosecution under the federal drug-user ban unconstitutional as applied, stressing the absence of individualized evidence of danger. And in 2026 the Justice Department revived the dormant 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) process for restoring federal firearm rights.


