Key Takeaways
- A cyber operation is generally judged a use of force by its effects, so intelligence gathering like the SolarWinds intrusion is unlikely to qualify.
- Operations that cause physical damage or long-lasting disruption of critical infrastructure, such as power grids or water systems, could be treated as a use of force.
- Ransomware is usually handled as a law enforcement problem, and it would approach a use of force only at a scale causing death or destruction.
If a foreign government hacked into U.S. infrastructure, would that be an attack on the United States under international law? When does a cyber operation cross the line into a "use of force"?
In this TalksOnLaw Brief, Joel Cohen talks with Duncan Hollis, the Laura H. Carnell Professor of Law at Temple University Beasley School of Law and a leading expert on international law and cybersecurity, about how the law on the use of force applies to operations in cyberspace.
Effects, Not Intrusion
Professor Hollis explains that the answer depends on the effects of the operation. He points to the SolarWinds operation, disclosed around the start of 2021 and attributed to Russian military intelligence, which reached many U.S. government entities and major firms. Because its apparent purpose was surveillance, data exfiltration, and intelligence gathering rather than causing harm, he does not view it as a use of force. A use of force would require affecting the integrity or availability of infrastructure: shutting down power for days or weeks rather than minutes, or targeting a water filtration facility or a civilian nuclear power plant in ways that go beyond surveillance. The United States, he notes, has made clear it would treat such operations as a use of force.
From the UN Charter to the Effects Doctrine
The starting point is Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against any state. When the Charter was negotiated, Professor Hollis says, it was understood to cover military force of the kind seen in World War II. Questions about non-kinetic weapons, such as biological and chemical agents, expanded the concept through treaties and state practice. In cyberspace, the test has become the "effects doctrine": if the effects of a cyber operation are analogous to those of conduct treated as a use of force in kinetic conflicts, that is enough.
Ransomware and Causation
Ransomware raises a different problem. States may treat it as a law enforcement matter, working through channels like Interpol, though Professor Hollis says a large enough spike would become a subject of international diplomacy. Whether it could rise to a use of force depends on scale and effects, with death and destruction as the benchmarks. He recalls a ransomware attack on a hospital in Düsseldorf, Germany, after which a rerouted patient died; German authorities concluded the delay had not caused the death, which shows how hard causation is to prove.
What to Know Now
The framework Professor Hollis describes remains the prevailing approach. Many states have published national positions on how international law applies in cyberspace, and most use some form of effects-based test drawn from the UN Charter and from the International Court of Justice's 1986 Nicaragua judgment, which distinguished the gravest uses of force, amounting to an "armed attack," from less serious ones. At the United Nations, an Open-Ended Working Group adopted a consensus final report in July 2025 and recommended a permanent Global Mechanism on ICT security, set to begin meeting in 2026, though states still differ on how specific rules apply. U.S. officials have also warned about state-sponsored intrusions, such as the activity known as Volt Typhoon, attributed to China, aimed at prepositioning access in critical infrastructure. Under the effects approach, access alone would likely not be a use of force, but using it to cause disruption could be.


