Key Takeaways
- Contract clauses letting one party terminate because the other files for bankruptcy or becomes insolvent are generally unenforceable once a bankruptcy case begins.
- Section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code blocks these ipso facto terminations, and the automatic stay separately halts creditor action against the debtor and its property.
- Exceptions include contracts that other law makes non-assignable, agreements to lend money or extend financial accommodations, and certain financial contracts such as swaps and derivatives.
Nearly every commercial contract seems to include a clause letting one side walk away if the other goes bankrupt. Does that clause actually work?
Joel Cohen talks with Rachel Albanese, now partner and co-chair of the Restructuring Group at Debevoise & Plimpton and co-chair of DLA Piper's U.S. Restructuring practice at the time of this conversation, about a widespread misconception. As common as these termination rights are, she explains, they are generally unenforceable under the Bankruptcy Code.
What the Clause Says
Albanese describes the typical provision: upon a party's insolvency, bankruptcy, or a similar proceeding, the other party may terminate the contract. Bankruptcy lawyers call these ipso facto clauses, because they are triggered by the bankruptcy or insolvency itself rather than by any breach.
Why the Law Overrides Them
The explanation starts with the bankruptcy estate. When a debtor files, it creates an estate, and all of the debtor's property belongs to that estate. Because the goal of Chapter 11 is to rehabilitate the debtor, the debtor needs that property. Congress therefore imposed the automatic stay, which halts creditor action against the debtor and its property. Its purpose, Albanese explains, is to prevent a race to the courthouse and ensure that similarly situated creditors are treated equally according to the priority of their claims, while giving the debtor a breathing spell, often one of the main reasons for filing. Separately, section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a counterparty from terminating a contract simply because of the debtor's bankruptcy or insolvency.
The Exceptions
Albanese identifies a handful of exceptions: where applicable non-bankruptcy law permits termination; contracts to make a loan or extend a financial accommodation; and complex financial contracts such as hedges, derivatives, and forward contracts. Why do the clauses persist? Partly because they are standard provisions that lawyers are reluctant to remove from their forms, and partly because they may be enforceable outside a bankruptcy proceeding. Her advice: call a bankruptcy lawyer, but start from the assumption that the termination right will not be enforceable upon a counterparty's bankruptcy or insolvency.
What to Know Now
These rules remain in place. Section 365(e)(1) applies to executory contracts and unexpired leases, and companion provisions in sections 541(c) and 363(l) similarly keep ipso facto clauses from stripping property out of the estate or blocking its use. The applicable-law exception in section 365(e)(2) typically covers contracts that cannot be assigned without consent under other law, such as certain personal service agreements, while the safe harbors in sections 555, 556, 559, 560, and 561 protect termination rights under securities, commodities, repurchase, swap, and master netting agreements. Courts read those safe harbors carefully, and litigation from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy tested how far they extend. Similar policies have spread abroad; the United Kingdom adopted a broad restriction on terminating supply contracts for insolvency in 2020. For anyone reviewing a contract today, Albanese's default assumption remains a sound starting point, with the exceptions checked against the specific agreement.


