Powers of the Modern CFIUS
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Powers of the Modern CFIUS

An interview with Aimen Mir and Colin Costello

CLE Credit
AZ· General
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CA· General
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CT· General
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NY· Areas of Professional Practice
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The United States has long prided itself on being open to foreign investment. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States — CFIUS — is the dramatic exception: a body with the power to unwind a deal in the name of national security, operating almost entirely out of public view. What can it actually do, and how should a company deciding whether to buy, sell, or invest plan around it?

In this TalksOnLaw interview, Joel Cohen is joined by two people who spent years inside the committee. Aimen Mir chaired CFIUS during nine years at the Treasury Department, helped negotiate the 2018 law that expanded its reach, and now leads Freshfields' CFIUS practice. Colin Costello served as the intelligence community's primary representative to CFIUS from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and now advises clients at Freshfields as well. The conversation moves between how the committee thinks and what that means for a deal.

What CFIUS Is — and What It Can Actually Do

CFIUS is an interagency committee chaired by Treasury and drawing on Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Energy, State, and others. Its jurisdiction runs to three kinds of transactions: those giving a foreign person control of a U.S. business, non-controlling investments in businesses involving critical technology, sensitive personal data, or critical infrastructure, and even bare real estate near sensitive government facilities.

A common misconception, Costello explains, is that CFIUS blocks deals. It does not; only the president can prohibit a transaction. The committee's real instrument is the negotiated mitigation agreement, backed by the veiled threat of recommending a prohibition. Because CFIUS acts by consensus, a president rarely overrides it — so parties told a prohibition is coming almost always withdraw and quietly abandon the deal. That quiet is by design: the committee works in a classified environment, and Treasury will not even confirm a review exists. Only a presidential prohibition becomes public, which is precisely the incentive to settle or walk away.

FIRRMA, Mandatory Filings, and the End of the Desktop Analysis

The 2018 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, which Mir helped shape, pushed the jurisdictional question past deal structure and into a closer look at the assets being acquired — and the implementing regulations leave real ambiguity. Mir is candid that these judgments are now hard for a business to make on its own.

FIRRMA also created mandatory filings, which arise when a target produces critical technologies that would require an export license to share with the investor, or when a foreign-government-backed investor takes a stake in a sensitive business. The penalty for missing one can reach the full value of the transaction, the obligation falls on buyer and seller alike, and there is no statute of limitations. Most filings remain voluntary, and the calculus there is a wager: the risk of a post-closing knock on the door against the safe harbor a clearance provides. The episode walks through the clocks — a 30-day short-form declaration, a 45-day review with an optional 45-day investigation, and the withdraw-and-refile that resets it all.

Negotiating in the Dark

Mitigation can range from a light supply-assurance commitment to a proxy board that renders an investment entirely passive. Parties find the negotiation frustrating, Costello acknowledges, because they cannot see the classified analysis and hold little leverage. Yet the fact that CFIUS is negotiating at all signals it believes the risk can be managed and wants the deal to close. The harder problem is that the committee often cannot say what worries it — Mir describes companies that never knew their commercial product sat inside a government system — leaving counsel to intuit the concern and engineer a path to yes.

An Expanding Definition of National Security

National security is undefined in the statute and keeps widening — from missiles and aircraft to artificial intelligence, robotics, and data, though only sensitive personal data, not data as such. China has drawn the most scrutiny, but Mir stresses that CFIUS is not country-specific and the risk exists regardless of where an investor is from.

What to Know Now

This conversation was recorded in early 2021, and its account of how CFIUS works still holds: the three kinds of jurisdiction, the two mandatory-filing triggers, the 30-day declaration and 45-plus-45-day notice clocks, and the President's exclusive power to prohibit a deal remain the framework today. What has grown is the committee's reach and its willingness to enforce. A 2022 executive order (EO 14083) directs CFIUS to weigh supply-chain resilience, U.S. technological leadership, cybersecurity, and risks to Americans' sensitive data. A rule effective December 26, 2024 raised the penalty for a missed mandatory filing to $5 million or the transaction value, whichever is greater, and for material misstatements to $5 million per violation; it also expanded the committee's subpoena power and lets it set deadlines in mitigation talks. Rules in 2023 and 2024 added 67 military installations to its real-estate jurisdiction, and Treasury reported in 2024 that CFIUS had issued three times more penalties since the start of 2023 than in its previous nearly 50 years.

Presidential action has also become more frequent and more public. President Biden blocked Nippon Steel's acquisition of U.S. Steel in January 2025; President Trump allowed it in June 2025 under a national security agreement that gives the U.S. government a "golden share," and has since ordered divestments of Jupiter Systems (2025) and EMCORE assets (2026). The February 2025 America First Investment Policy calls for faster reviews for allied investors and tighter limits on investment tied to China, and Treasury's Known Investor fast-track remains a pilot. TikTok, discussed here as an aberration, was ultimately resolved by a 2024 divest-or-ban law, upheld by the Supreme Court in January 2025, and a majority-American joint venture that closed in January 2026.

Additional Resources

Navigating CFIUS  (Freshfields Insights)

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)  (U.S. Department of the Treasury)

About Aimen Mir and Colin Costello

“[Under the Biden administration,] where you’re most likely to see fairly significant change is in process. … It’ll go back to that black box model.”

Aimen Mir

Aimen is a partner at Freshfields in the Washington-based antitrust, competition and trade practice and global sanctions and trade practice. He joined the firm after serving in several leadership roles in CFIUS and the US Department of the Treasury. Most recently, he spent four years as deputy assistant secretary for investment security at the US Department of the Treasury, serving as the senior-most career CFIUS official and implementing Treasury’s role as the chair of CFIUS. Aimen played a leading role in shaping and negotiating the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), the most significant expansion of CFIUS’s powers in 30 years. He also shaped key elements of the emerging and foundational technologies provisions of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Aimen also previously served as counsel in the national security division of the US Department of Justice. Aimen started his career in the Washington, DC office of another law firm where he advised and represented companies in regulatory compliance, investigations, and enforcement matters under export control, economic sanctions, trade remedy, and other laws regulating international business transactions.

 

Colin Costello

Colin is a CFIUS client advisor at Freshfields, in the national security practice, based in Washington, DC. Colin has been at the forefront of U.S. government deliberations over threats associated with foreign investment for nearly a decade. Prior to joining Freshfields, Colin served as the Acting Director of the National Intelligence Council, Investment Security Group within the Office of Director of National Intelligence. Colin led the Intelligence Community’s analytic support to CFIUS and served as the Intelligence Community’s primary representative to CFIUS, participating in every CFIUS review since March 2013.  He also led the Intelligence Community’s support for the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector (known as Team Telecom) and other foreign investment regulatory processes.