Key Takeaways
- Common carriage is an old legal doctrine requiring certain essential services, like railroads or a lone bridge, to serve all comers on equal terms.
- In Moody v. NetChoice (2024), the Supreme Court said that curating and moderating content in feeds is expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.
- The Court sent the Florida and Texas laws back to lower courts for further review, so whether any parts of those laws can be enforced is still being litigated.
If a handful of platforms control much of today's public conversation, should the law require them to carry everyone, the way a phone company or railroad must? Several states have tried to do just that.
In this TalksOnLaw Brief, Eric Goldman, Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law, explains the common carrier concept, why he believes it does not fit social media, and how state "must carry" laws raise the same constitutional problem.
An Old Doctrine
Professor Goldman describes common carriage as a venerable concept grounded in the idea that certain services are so imbued with the public interest that they must serve all comers. He gives the example of the only bridge across a river for hundreds of miles: the operator should not be able to decide that only certain kinds of people may cross. Mail carriers, railroads, and bridge operators, he notes, are not publishers deciding what is fit for an audience.
Apples and Oranges
Social media services, by contrast, exercise editorial discretion. Professor Goldman sees two independent problems with treating them as common carriers. First, the model does not fit, and it is hard even to see how a statute would be drafted. Second, and more important in his view, forcing services to take all comers would infringe their free speech and free press rights. Because the limit comes from the Constitution, he explains, it binds Congress, state legislatures, and agencies alike. He also argues that such laws are often passed for their messaging value, and that when choosing who sets the rules for online speech, he would rather trust private services than the government.
Must-Carry Laws
Professor Goldman explains that must-carry obligations are a narrower version of the same idea. Florida's law, for example, barred platforms from removing certain political candidates during election periods and limited moderation of content from certain journalistic enterprises. In his view, telling a publisher what it must carry is an imposition of government censorship, not a cure for it.
What to Know Now
The Supreme Court took up the Florida and Texas laws in Moody v. NetChoice (2024). Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan explained that when platforms curate their main feeds, they engage in expressive activity, and the government cannot override those editorial choices simply to change the mix of viewpoints, drawing on Miami Herald v. Tornillo. All nine Justices agreed to vacate the lower court rulings, but because the challenges attacked the laws on their face, the Court sent both cases back for a fuller analysis of every service and function the laws reach. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, would have given the states more room, and Justice Thomas again suggested that common carrier arguments deserve serious consideration.
Before Moody, the Fifth Circuit had accepted the common carrier theory in upholding the Texas law, and the Supreme Court majority criticized that court's First Amendment analysis. On remand, litigation continues in federal courts in Florida and Texas. Supporters of these laws argue that dominant platforms wield public-square power that calls for nondiscrimination rules; critics, including Professor Goldman, see such rules as government control of private speech. For now, Moody gives platforms strong protection for their core editorial decisions.


