The criminal cases against Donald Trump put lawyers at the center of the story: a personal lawyer turned star witness, a former mayor disbarred for his statements about the 2020 election, prosecutors accused of political motives and personal conflicts, and judges whose impartiality was publicly questioned. Setting aside guilt or innocence, the cases offer a vivid survey of the rules that govern lawyers, prosecutors, and judges.
In this TalksOnLaw interview, recorded in July 2024, Joel Cohen speaks with two legal ethics scholars and former prosecutors: Bruce Green, the Louis Stein Chair at Fordham Law School and a former Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, and Rebecca Roiphe, the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor at New York Law School and a former Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan. Their analysis does not always break along partisan lines.
Assisting a Client's Crime
The professors explain Rule 1.2(d), which bars a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, and why "knowingly" matters, using the classic question of a client asking which countries lack extradition treaties. They discuss the ABA's 2023 amendment to Rule 1.16(a) requiring lawyers to inquire into and assess the facts of a representation, and the obstruction charge against Senator Bob Menendez based on false statements his lawyer relayed to prosecutors in a proffer session, as an example of how a lawyer can unknowingly become an instrument of a client's wrongdoing.
Michael Cohen, Confidentiality, and Lawyers as Witnesses
Michael Cohen, disbarred in 2019 after pleading guilty to federal crimes including lying to Congress, became the key witness in the Manhattan hush money trial. Green and Roiphe discuss the scope of the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception, the broader duty of confidentiality, Rule 8.4(c)'s prohibition on dishonesty and its First Amendment limits, when prosecutors may call a lawyer to testify against a former client, the obligations of a prosecutor relying on a witness with a history of lying, and Cohen's secret recording of his client. They also examine Robert Costello, who testified for the defense while claiming to have been Cohen's lawyer, and whether his public attacks on Cohen breached duties owed to a former client.
Prosecutors: Trial Conduct and Discretion
The conversation turns to Stormy Daniels's testimony and a prosecutor's duty under Rule 3.4(e) not to allude to matters the lawyer does not reasonably believe are relevant or admissible, to gag orders and the rule on extrajudicial statements by lawyers and witnesses, and to the debate over whether Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg should have brought the case at all. Roiphe explains her view, set out in a New York Times opinion piece, that the case was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, while Green, invoking Robert Jackson's warning about prosecutors choosing their defendants, explains why many people see it differently.
The Georgia Disqualification Fight
Both professors joined an amicus brief arguing that Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis's romantic relationship with Nathan Wade, the special prosecutor she appointed, was not a disqualifying conflict of interest. They explain why conflicts that do not harm the defendant are unusual grounds for disqualification, and how nepotism and personal relationships among lawyers are treated, especially in small communities with few lawyers.
Judges and Justices
Green and Roiphe explain why a judge appointed by a party is not disqualified from presiding over that party's case, discuss the criticism of Judge Aileen Cannon's handling of the classified documents case and the role of unconscious bias, and address calls for Justices Thomas and Alito to recuse themselves from the presidential immunity case because of their spouses' views, explaining how the Supreme Court's recusal practice differs from that of lower courts.
Disciplining Lawyers for What They Say
The program closes with Rudy Giuliani's New York disbarment, based largely on false public statements about the 2020 election rather than any criminal conviction. The professors explain why they find discipline for lawyers' public political speech troubling under the First Amendment, the risk of chilling unpopular but important speech, the "should have known" standard the court applied, the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings, and how readmission after disbarment works in New York.
What to Know Now
Since this conversation, the cases have run their course. In the Manhattan case, Trump received an unconditional discharge in January 2025, leaving his conviction on 34 counts of falsifying business records in place without any punishment; his appeal of the conviction is pending in the New York courts, and a federal judge in August 2026 again rejected his effort to move the case to federal court. Judge Cannon dismissed the classified documents case in July 2024, and after the 2024 election the special counsel dropped that appeal and the federal election case was dismissed. In Georgia, the Court of Appeals disqualified Willis in December 2024, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to review that ruling, and the prosecutor appointed to replace her dropped the case in November 2025. Senator Menendez was convicted in July 2024 and sentenced to 11 years in prison. Giuliani was also disbarred in the District of Columbia later in 2024. The amended Rule 1.16(a) discussed here has been adopted in a growing number of states, including New York, where it took effect on July 1, 2026.
